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NOTE
PROTECTION AGAINST ILLEGAL MEANS
OF OBTAINING EVIDENCE
The determination of the extent of the protection which will be
accorded to one accused of crime, as against the efforts of law enforce-
ment officials to obtain evidence of his guilt directly from him, re-
quires a balancing of the need for restraints on the overzealousness of
police officers dealing with those merely suspected of crime as against
the necessities of obtaining evidence to convict criminals. The flagrant
barbarities practiced against accused offenders in past centuries led
to the erection of civil rights guarantees against such abuses, two
of these being the privilege against self-incrimination and the rule
holding coerced confessions inadmissible.1 Professor Wigmore points
out that these rules are different in scope and origin, but that courts
have often confused them. "So far as concerns principle, the two
doctrines have not the same boundaries; i.e. the privilege covers only
statements made in court under process as a witness; the confession
rule covers statements made out of court, but may, also overlapping,
cover statements made in court. ' 2 The aim of these two rules is to ex-
clude from evidence testimonial utterances given unwillingly by the
witness or the accused under force of legal process or as a result of
physical torture; but the advent of science into the field of criminal
investigation has led to attempts to extend the prohibitions to almost
every kind of effort to obtain incriminating evidence from the accused's
mind, body, and possessions. Consequently, there exists a danger of
extending the protection so far that legitimate efforts of the prosecu-
tion may be impaired. But ingenious police officers continue to em-
ploy new devices on accused persons, and the courts must decide
whether they go beyond the bounds of due process of law, and whether
the accused is protected from their use by the rule against coerced
confessions or the privilege against self-incrimination.
"The modern rule against coerced confessions was not given a full and clear
expression until Warickshall's case in 1783. 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 238.
The privilege against self-incrimination, however, was crystallized almost a century
and a half earlier in the trial of John Lilburn in 1637. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.
1940) 298. This latter privilege was developed as a weapon against the inquisitorial
methods of the Court of Star Chamber and the ecclesiastical courts.
28 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 387.
NOTE
These issues were recently presented to the Supreme Court of
the United States in Rochin v. California.3 Three deputy sheriffs of
Los Angeles County had entered the bedroom of one Antonio Rochin,
whom they suspected of illegally possessing narcotics. Two capsules,
which were wrapped in cellophane, were seen by the deputies on a
small table inside the room, but before the deputies could seize the
capsules, Rochin had placed them in his mouth and swallowed them.
Rochin was then handcuffed and taken to a local hospital where a
physician strapped him to a table in the operating room, placed a
pail beside him, and forcibly injected a tube down the unwilling
victim's throat, through which an emetic solution was released into
his stomach. Rochin vomited, and the cellophane-wrapped capsules,
which were found to contain morphine, floated in the pail. This evi-
dence was used to convict Rochin in the California court.4 An appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the con-
viction was reversed on the ground that the taking of the capsules
from the defendant's stomach deprived him of due process of law
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.5 In the view of the Court
the conduct of the officers was brutal, shocking to the conscience, and
offensive to the community's sense of fair play and decency.6
Applicability of the Federal Bill of Rights to State
Criminal Proceedings
Differing in their reasoning from a majority of the Court, Justices
Black7 and Douglas 8 announced in concurring opinions that they
would have reversed the conviction on the ground that the defendant
was protected by the privilege against self-incrimination contained in
the Fifth Amendment 9 from having his stomach pumped to obtain
evidence against him. To reach this result, these Justices would have
the Fifth Amendment privileges apply to the states through the Four-
872 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. ed. 154 (1952).
'The conviction was affirmed in People v. Rochin, 1O Cal. App. (2d) 140, 225
P. (2d) 1 (195o), noted in (1951) 25 Tulane L. Rev. 410. This case was in accord
with an earlier case upholding the use of evidence obtained by the use of a
stomach pump. People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App. (2d) 199, 168 P. (2d)
443 (1946).
OU. S. Const. Amend. XIV.
ORochin v. California, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. ed. 154 (1952).
7See Rochin v. California, 72 S. Ct. 205, 211, 96 L. ed. 154, 16o (1952).
"See Rochin v. California, 72 S. Ct. 205, 212, 96 L. ed. 154, 161 (1952). All other
Justices concurred with the reasoning of Justice Frankfurter, with the exception
of Justice Minton, who took no part in the decision.
'U. S. Const. Amend. V.
195,2]
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teenth Amendment. They reaffirmed the view taken in a dissent in
Adamson v. California,10 wherein Justice Black, joined by Justice
Douglas, urged that the scope of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment included, and was limited to, the specific provisions
of the first eight amendments to the Constitution. The impact of this
view, when applied to the facts of the Rochin case, is twofold.
First, it would repudiate repeated pronouncements by the Court
that the Due process Clause includes only those provisions of the Bill
of Rights which are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental,"'1 1 or are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."'12 Those provisions of the first eight amend-
ments which have been held to be "fundamental" are: Freedom of
religion,1 3 speech, 14 press,'3 and assembly;' 6 and freedom from illegal
searches and seizures.' 7 In certain cases the right to assistance of coun-
sel is considered essential to due process.' 8 Among those provisions
which are not so "fundamental" as to be essential to due process are:
"332 U. S. 46, 68, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 1684, 91 L. ed. 1903, 1917 (1947). Apparently fav-
oring a close, literal interpretation of constitutional provisions, Justice Black disap-
proved of any such nebulous formula as the "fundamental" standard used by the
majority in the Adamson case. It was his belief that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights in its entirety. For a
thorough discussion of the Amendment's history, see Justice Black's Appendix: 332
U. S. 46 at 92, 67 S. Ct. 1672 at 1696, 91 L. ed. 1903 at 1930 (1947). Justice Murphy,
joined by Justice Rutledge, dissented seperately. 332 U. S. 46, 123, 67 S. Ct. 1672,
1683, 91 L. ed 1903, 1946 (1947). These two Justices agreed with Justice Black that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included the Bill of Rights,
but they did not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment is necessarily limited to
the provisions of the first eight amendments.
'Snyder v, Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 1o5, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332, 78 L. ed. 674, 677
(1934).
12Palko v. Connecticut, 3o2 U. S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152, 82 L. ed. 288, 292
(1937)-
'Cantwell v. Connecticut, 31o U. S. 296, 6o S. Ct. 9oo, 84 L. ed. 1213 (1940).
21 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. ed. 278 (1937); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925).
"Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U. S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 44, 8o L. ed. 66o
(1936).
IODe Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. ed. 278 (1937).
"7 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. ed. 1782 (1949), noted in
(195o) 7 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 51.
"Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. ed. 158 (1932) held that
a state denied due process to a defendant in a rape prosecution by refusing to
furnish counsel for his defense when the punishment could be death if he was
convicted. Cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. ed. 1595 (1942),
where the Court held assistance of counsel not to be "fundamental" in a prose-
cution for robbery where the punishment was limited to imprisonment.
NOTE
The right to bear arms,19 to indictment by grand jury,20 to jury trial
in criminal cases, 21 the freedom from twice being placed in jeopardy
for the same offense, 22 and the privilege against self-incrimination. 23
The Court stated in Twining v. New Jersey24 that the privilege
against self-incrimination was not "fundamental," because, historically,
it was not a part of the law of the land in England, and thus not
within the traditional definition of due process of law. The Court
further maintained that the privilege was not essential to affording
an accused (i) reasonable notice of the crime with which he was
charged and (2) a fair opportunity to be heard, the two tests repeatedly
used by the Court in procedural due process controversies. Reaffirming
the Twining case in Adamson v. California, the Court maintained
that for a state to deny an accused the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion "is not necessarily a breach of a state's obligations to give a fair
trial."25
Secondly, to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in the
Rochin case, Justices Black and Douglas would repudiate the well
established rule that the one claiming the privilege is only protected
against testimonial compulsion. This is the rule in a majority of states26
and in the federal courts.27 Under this interpretation of the privilege,
a defendant in a criminal case may be forced to reveal to the jury the
scars on his body.28 He may be made to grow a beard,29 to place his
"Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 6 S. Ct. 580, 29 L. ed. 615 (1886).
2"Hurtado v. California, iio U. S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 L. ed. 232 (1884).
"Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 2o S. Ct. 448, 44 L. ed. 597 (1900).
-Palko v. Connecticut, 3o2 U. S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. ed. 288 (937).
"Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. ed. 1903 (1947);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 97 (19o8). Cf. State v.
Height, 117 Iowa 65
o , 91 N. W. 935 (1902), where an Iowa court held that the
privilege was an integral part of the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution,
although the constitution had no specific privilege against self-incrimination
provision.
24211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 97 (1908).
2332 U. S. 46, 54, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 1677, 91 L. ed. 19o3, 191o (1947).
"State v. Sturtevant, 96 N. H. 99, 70 A. (2d) 909 at 911 (1950); 8 Wigmore,
Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §2263. Compare the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Belt
in State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, i6o P. (2d) 283, 292 (1945).
"In Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 252, 31 S. Ct. 2, 6, 54 L. ed. 1o21, 1o3o
(191o), Justice Holmes stated that the privilege against self-incrimination is a
"prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."
mState v. Oschoa, 49 Nev. 194, 242 Pac. 582 (1926), noted in (1926) 24 Mich. L.
Rev. 617. For an exhaustive discussion see Inbau, Self-Incrimination-What can an
Accused Be Compelled to Do? (1938) 28 J. Crim. L. 261.
"Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 182 N. E. 865 (1932).
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shoes in tracks,30 and to try on an article of clothing.
3 ' Had the
Supreme Court followed the view of Justices Black and Douglas and
decided in the Rochin case that the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination had been violated, all this authority, both state and
federal, would have been repudiated, for the taking of capsules from
the defendant's stomach was not an extraction of testimony.
The Ratio Decidendi of the Rochin Case
A majority of the Court, however, refused to overrule the principle
that only those provisions of the Bill of Rights which are "funda-
mental" apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, the Court was unwilling to overrule Adamson v. Cali-
fornia32 and Twining v. New Jersey33 which held that the privilege
against self-incrimination was not such a "fundamental" provision.
Since the Court decided the case on grounds other than the privilege
against self-incrimination, it was not concerned with the problem
of whether the scope of the privilege extends beyond testimonial
compulsion. The due process objection found by a majority of the
Justices was that the pumping of an accused's stomach was brutal
conduct akin to obtaining evidence by torture. The Court found "that
the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combatting crime too energetically. It is conduct that shocks the
conscience ... [and is] too close to the rack and the screw to permit
of constitutional differentiation."3 4 Justice Frankfurter compared this
case to Brown v. Mississippi, 35 where the Court held that state officials
People v. Van Wormer, 175 N. Y. 188, 67 N. E. 299 (193o).
3Benson v. State, 69 S. W. 165 (Tex. Crim. 19o2). Cf. Allen v. State, 183 Md.
6o3, 39 A. (2d) 82o (1944), where the court limits the scope of the privilege to
"testimonial compulsion," but refuses to allow a defendant to be compelled to try
on a hat at the trial, on the ground that such an act would constitute "testimony"
within the meaning of the privilege.
32332 U. S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. ed. 19o3 (1947).
21i U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 97 (19o8).
"Rochin v. California, 72 S. Ct. 2o5, 2o9, 96 L. ed. 154, 159 (1952).
'297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461, 8o L. ed. 682 (1936). The protection of the Due
Process Clause extends beyond torture and includes conduct which places an
accused in apprehension, although no violence actually occurs. Malinski v. New
York, 324 U. S. 401, 65 S. Ct. 781, 89 L. ed. 1029 (1945). The use of "third degree"
methods also comes within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 64 S. Ct. 921, 88 L. ed. 1192 (1944). For a further dis-
cussion of Supreme Court decisions dealing with coerced confessions, see Note (1948)
5 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 243.
NOTE
deprived a defendant of due process of law by extracting a verbal con-
fession of guilt from him by torture.
"It would be a stultification of the responsibility which the
course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold
that in order to convict a man the police cannot extract by
force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach.
"To attempt in this case to distinguish what lawyers call
'real evidence' from verbal evidence is to ignore the reasons for
excluding coerced confessions. Use of involuntary verbal con-
fessions in State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not
only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible under
the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in
them may be independently established as true. Coerced confes-
sions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency."3 6
The Rochin case, however, differs from the ordinary case of coerced
confessions in that the morphine capsules were willfully concealed by
the accused in the presence of the arresting officers. It could be argued
that whatever "torture" was inflicted upon the defendant was caused
by his own act of concealing the evidence and in resisting the officers'
attempts to retrieve it, for no allegations of force were pointed out by
the Court other than that application of force necessary to compel
the insertion of the tube into the defendant's stomach. The Supreme
Court of Texas recognized this distinction when a similar problem was
presented in Ash v. State.3 7 In that case the defendant was suspected
of having possession of stolen jewelry. When the police officers entered
his room, he, like Rochin, swallowed the incriminating evidence. At
a hospital, metal objects were located in defendant's stomach by use of
a fluoroscope. At the local jail, the defendant was kept under watch
for several hours, but he refused to allow his bowels to move. As a
result, the defendant was returned to a hospital and was forcibly
given an enema, after which the officers retrieved two rings, which
were part of the missing jewelry. The reviewing court sustained the
admission of the rings in evidence and, in so doing, drew some per-
suasive analogies, all of which seem equally applicable to the Rochin
case. Justice Beauchamp posed this question:
"Could it be said that if a thief has stolen property, sewed it up
in his pocket, or in the lining of his coat, that the officers would
have no right to cut the stitches or even to injure his clothing
for the purpose of securing the valuables belonging to an-
other ... ?,,38
'Rochin v. California, 72 S. Ct. 205, 210, 96 L. ed. 154, 159 (1952).
m1ig Tex. Crim. 420, 141 S. W. (2d) 341 (1940).
SAsh v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 42o, 141 S. W. (2d) 341, 343 (1940).
1952]
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A second analogy was suggested by Justice Graves in ruling on a motion
for a rehearing:
"Had appellant merely held these rings in his hand and refused
to open it so that they might be recovered, we think the officers
would have been justified in either waiting in patience until
appellant saw fit to open his hand, or in forcibly opening the
hand and recovering the property. So in this instance after ascer-
taining the presence of these rings in appellant's body, they
could either patiently wait until these rings passed through ap-
pellant's body in a natural way, or they could assist nature by
means of an enema in recovering this stolen property."
3 9
Clearly, the decision in Ash v. State would have been reversed had
it been decided by the Supreme Court, since the same type of "brutal-
ity" was involved that the Court condemned in the Rochin case.
However, the Texas court looked upon the "brutality" in a different
light. There, it was said that the defendant's "possession of the rings
and secreting them in the presence of the officers ... gave them a
legal right to arrest him and search his person."40 Had the defendant
run with the rings to avoid arrest, the officers would have been justified
in using whatever force was necessary to prevent his escape. 41 Little
logic can be found for holding that an accused is immune from force
when he accomplishes the same result in a more subtle, though no less
effective manner.
Nevertheless, the Rochin decision is not without justification. It
is true that the facts of these two cases are distinguishable from the
indiscriminate use of the stomach pump or the enema as methods for
searching all persons suspected of crime, yet the condoning of a limited
use of these devices could lead to their employment by unscrupulous
police officials outside the realm of reasonable law enforcement to
thwart crafty felons who would use the viscera as a storehouse for
evidences of crime. There can be no doubt in the present case that
Rochin was guilty. It is undisputed that the capsules he swallowed
contained morphine. The result of the Court's decision is to leave
unconvicted a man admittedly guilty of crime. But civil rights provi-
sions, to be effective must apply equally to all persons. Therefore, the
primary consideration of the court in defining due process of law must
be to protect all of the innocent rather than to convict all of the guilty.
Ash v. State, 19 Tex. Crim. 420, 141 S. W. (2d) 41, 344 (1940).
4°Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 420, 141 S. W. (2d) 341, 343 (1940) [italics supplied].
"Miller, Criminal Law (1934) 257.
NOTE
Sanctions Applied to Deter Future Violations of Civil Rights
The Court does not uniformly apply the same sanctions in all
cases where police officers have deprived an accused of due process
of law. It would seem that the most effective means of providing redress
for the wrong committed, while at the same time deterring similar con-
duct by police in the future, would be to hold the evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to be inadmissible in any
prosecution of the accused. In the federal courts and in a minority
of states illegally obtained evidence is not admissible, but in a major-
ity of the states the rule is contrary.4 2 Thus, in the Rochin case the
California court had found that the deputy sheriffs had violated state
law in obtaining the capsules from Rochin, but under the practice in
"Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914) held
evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the unreasonable searches and
seizures provision of the Fourth Amendment to be inadmissible. If the unreasonable
search is made by a private individual the evidence is admissible in federal courts.
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. ed. 1o48, 13 A. L. R. 1159
(192i). States which adopt the Weeks rule have followed this distinction. Kendall v.
Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 169, 259 S. W. 71 (1924). Moreover, the Weeks rule applies
only to criminal prosecutions and not to civil actions. Walker v. Penner, 19o Ore.
542, 227 P. (2d) 316 at 318 (1951). In McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 63 S.
Ct. 6o8, 87 L. ed. 8,g (1943), the Court held evidence inadmissible which was ob-
tained at a time when the accused was being held in violation of statute. Thus, in
the federal courts today, evidence is inadmissible if obtained by federal officers
while violating either a federal statute or the unreasonable searches and seizures
provision of the Fourth Amendment. Thirty-one states have rejected the rule of the
Weeks case, while sixteen states have followed it. Rhode Island is the only state
which has not directly passed on the question.
For an exhaustive survey of the impact of the Weeks case on state decisions, see
Appendix to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 at 33, 69
S. Ct. 1359 at 1364, 93 L. ed. 1782 at 1788 (1949). Note, however, that in Table I
Justice Frankfurter inadvertently lists Iowa as a state which adheres to the Weeks
rule, when in fact the Iowa courts have repeatedly rejected the rule. State v. Nelson,
231 Iowa 177, 3oo N. W. 685 (1941); State v. Rowley, 197 Iowa 977, 195 N. W. 881
(1923). The Justice failed to note that the case which he correctly cites in Table
B as adhering to the Weeks doctrine [State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N. W.
730 (19o3)] was squarely overruled by the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Tonn,
195 Iowa 94, 191 N. W. 530, 536 (1923), where the court states: "Notwithstanding
our previous holdings, and notwithstanding the rule recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States, we are disposed to and do hold that the objection to
this evidence when offered in behalf of the state, on the ground that it was obtained
by an unlawful search, was not well taken, and that the court did not err in over-
ruling said objection."
For a more extensive discussion of the subject of illegally obtained evidence,
see Lyons, Utilization of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts To Supervise Con-
duct of Federal Law Enforcement Officers (195o) 7 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. i. For a
discussion of searches without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, see Notes
(1950) 7 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 184, (1948) 5 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 93.
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that state the evidence thus secured was nevertheless admissible.
4 3
However, when the Supreme Court decided that the conduct of the
officers was in violation of the Due Process Clause, it held the evidence
inadmissible, undoubtedly assuming that this ruling would help to
deter police officers from using such means in the future.
In contrast, the Court held in Wolf v. Colorado44 that the provision
against unreasonable searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment
was so "fundamental" as to apply against the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court ruled
that due process was satisfied if the state provided sanctions against
officers who made the illegal search or seizure; thus, the federal rule
making the illegally obtained evidence inadmissible was not imposed
upon the states.
In both the Rochin case and Brown v. Mississippi45 the due pro-
cess objection resulted in a holding that the evidence illegally obtained
was inadmissible, whereas in Wolf v. Colorado the fact that the evi-
dence was seized without a warrant had no effect on its admissibility.
The result of the Brown decision might be reconciled with the rule
of the Wolf case on the reasoning that the coerced confession in the
former case was unreliable, because the defendant may have falsely
admitted guilt to avoid further torture, while no such unreliability
exists where the evidence is "real" rather than "verbal." 46 However,
this explanation of the decisions breaks down in the Rochin case,
where the Court held "real" evidence inadmissible. The probative
value of the capsules in the Rochin case and of the evidence secured
without a warrant in Wolf v. Colorado is equally unimpaired by the
illegality of the seizures; nevertheless, one is admissible, the other not,
under the Due Process Clause. Possibly the Court recognized after
the Wolf decision that the sanction of inadmissibility is far more
effective to deter police officials from illegal practices which invade
civil rights than is the theoretical liability of police officers to criminal
"People v. Rochin, 1o Cal. App. (2d) 140, 225 P. (2d) i at 3 (1950).
"338 U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1356, 93 L. ed. 1782 (1949), noted in (1950) 7 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 51.
"297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461, 8o L. ed. 682 (1936).
"The Brown case gives constitutional support to the common law rule ex-
cluding involuntary confessions. The reason assigned for holding these confessions
inadmissible is that the confessions may be false. 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 1940)
250. But Justice Frankfurter says that coerced confessions are not excluded solely
on this ground, but also because they "offend the community's sense of fair play
and decency." Rochin v. California, 72 S. Ct- 205, 21o, 96 L. ed. 154, 159 (1952).
NOTE
prosecution or civil action.47 On the other hand, the Court may not
have withdrawn from its position in the Wolf case. The Rochin de-
cision may be a manifestation of a belief among the Justices that a
more stringent sanction should be imposed in situations where the
objectionable conduct violates the person of the accused than is in-
voked where only the sanctity of the home is invaded. However, some
of the language used by the Court indicates that the sanction of inad-
missibility may not apply to all violations of the person, but only to
those which shock the conscience and "afford brutality the cloak of
law.,'4
8
None of these distinctions is very convincing. The Supreme Court,
as final arbiter of personal liberties, should have a conscience no less
sensitive than the Constitution itself. Therefore, all types of conduct
which deprive persons of due process of law should shock the con-
science of the Court, and ought to be worth preventing. If holding
evidence inadmissible will best accomplish this result, little reason
can be discerned for not applying this sanction uniformly to all
violations.
Impact of the Rochin Case on the Use of Other Scientific Devices
By holding unconstitutional the obtaining of evidence from a
a person's stomach, the Court has cast some doubts upon the ad-
missibility of evidence obtained from other parts of the body. The
analysis of human blood has been used increasingly by the courts to
settle questions of fact ranging from the determination of non-pater-
nity49 to the establishment of a murderer's identity. For example,
'Cf. People v. De Fore, 242 N. Y. 13, 15o N. E. 585 at 587 (1926). Chief Judge
Cardozo maintained that criminal prosecution, civil liability, and administrative
discipline are sufficient sanctions to prevent the illegal seizure of evidence without
resort to the Weeks doctrine. He admits that to satisfy the victim of the illegal
search completely the evidence should be rendered inadmissible against him, but a
balance of this factor against the public interest in convicting criminals and the
possibility that one bungling policeman might spoil an entire prosecution by one
inopportune search dictates that the evidence be admissible despite the illegality of
its seizure. But see Note (1934) 43 Yale L. J. 847 for an analysis of cases showing the
ineffectiveness of liability of police officers to civil action by the victim of the
illegal search.
Is Rochin v. California, 72 S. Ct. 205, 21o, 96 L. ed. 154, 159 (1952).
"Jordan v. Mace, -69 A. (2d) 670 (Me. 1949), noted in (1950) 7 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 208. Cf. Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N. J. Misc. 633, 16 A. (2d) 8o (194o),
where the court held a statute unconstitutional which authorized the court to
compel parties to submit to blood tests in paternity cases. The reason assigned by
the court was that the statute invaded a person's right to privacy. Overruled in
Cortese v. Cortese, so N. J. Super. 152, 76 A. (2d) 717 (1950).
201
202 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IX
in the recent case of State v. Alexander,50 a defendant accused of mur-
der voluntarily gave a sample of his blood to health officers to de-
termine whether he was infected with a venereal disease. Without his
consent, the health officers submitted an unused portion of the de-
fendant's blood to the police, who compared it with blood found at
the scene of the crime, and used the result of the test as evidence
to prove his guilt. On appeal, the admission of this evidence was
upheld by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, but all authorities are not
in accord with this view. Aside from the problem of the reliability
of blood grouping tests,51 probably all courts would hold such evi-
dence admissible if the defendant freely consented to the taking of his
blood for the purpose of the test. Some courts will rationalize the
finding of a waiver of any objection to admissibility from the failure
of the defendant to object at the time the blood was taken. 52 Others
have gone so far as to admit evidence of blood taken from an uncon-
scious person, where no consent, express or implied, could be had.53
However, no cases have been found which go so far as to allow police
forcibly to compel a defendant to give his blood for analysis. The
Model Code of Evidence states that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is not a bar to compulsory blood testing, but reserves comment
on whether there is some other ground for inadmissibility.54
The Rochin case may have an impact on these problems. Analyti-
cally there would seem to be no valid basis for differentiating between
getting evidence from the veins and getting it from the stomach.
Nevertheless, it is stated in the Rochin decision:
'7 N. J. 585, 83 A. (2d) 441 (1951).
'The reluctance of courts to accept the results of blood grouping tests as con-
clusive is graphically shown by Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. (2d) 652, 169 P. (2d)
442 (1946), noted in (1947) 4 Wash. & Lee Rev. 199, and State v. Damm, 62 S. D.
123, 252 N. W. 7 (1933). For a discussion of this problem, see Boyd, Protecting the
Evidentiary Value of Blood Group Determinations (1943) 16 So. Calif. L. Rev. 193;
Britt, Blood-Grouping Tests and the Law: The Problem of "Cultural Lag" (1937)
21 Minn. L. Rev. 671; Note (1952) 5 Fla. L. Rev. 5 at 17. The Rochin decision would
in no way affect this problem, for there the Court was not concerned with the
probative value of the evidence, but rather with whether the method used to
obtain the evidence violated some private right of the defendant's.
'State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. (2d) 435 (1937). Cf. Davis v. State, 189 Md.
640, 57 A. (2d) 289 (1948).
61 State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 16o P. (2d) 283 (1945). This case deals with blood
tests to show intoxication rather than with blood grouping tests. Although the
two types of tests differ from the standpoint of laboratory analysis, the blood is
obtained in the same manner regardless of the method of analysis later to be per-
formed upon it, and the problem of whether the blood was legally obtained remains
the same.
"4Model Code of Evidence (1942) Rule 2o 5 (b).
NOTE
"In deciding this case we do not heedlessly bring into ques-
tion decisions in many States dealing with essentially different,
even if related, problems. We, therefore, put to one side cases
which have arisen in the State courts through use of modern
methods and devices for discovering wrongdoers and bringing
them to book. It does not fairly represent these decisions to sug-
gest that they legalize force so brutal and so offensive to human
dignity in securing evidence from a suspect as is revealed by this
record." 5
The Court would probably exclude from the principle of the
Rochin case state statutes and decisions authorizing compulsory blood
tests to determine non-paternity and to prevent the spread of venereal
disease. The public interest of the state in the parent-child relation-
ship and in the health of its citizens would seem to outweigh con-
siderations of individual privacy. Futhermore, the results of blood
tests in these situations are not used in evidence in a criminal trial
against the one whose blood was tested.
Blood samples obtained with the express consent of the donor
should also be exempted from the rule of the Rochin case, because no
"brutality" would be involved. The words of Justice Frankfurter,
excluding from the scope of the Rochin doctrine state court decisions
involving certain scientific devices, may not mean that there is no due
process objection to decisions which have found a waiver from the
lack of affirmative resistance to the taking of blood. Where the de-
fendant submits to the test because of a real or imagined fear of violence
if he refuses, the constitutional objection would seem to remain. More-
over, it is doubtful that the Court would sanction the taking of blood
from an unconscious defendant. True, no "brutality" would be in-
volved here, yet consciousness would seem to be a poor standard upon
which to determine constitutional rights.
Justice Frankfurter may have had in mind other scientific devices
than blood tests for bringing criminals to book. In United States v.
Kelly the forcible fingerprinting of persons accused of crime was held
not to violate constitutional or common law rights of the accused.56
.72 S. Ct. 205, 210, 96 L. ed. 154, 159 (1952).
r55 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). The Kelly case allowed forcible fingerprinting
even in the absence of statute. Accord: Shannon v. State, 207 Ark. 658, 182 S. W.
(2d) 384 (1944); Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N. J. Eq. 141, 152 At. 17 (1930). Contra:
People v. Hevern, 127 Misc. 141, 215 N. Y. Supp. 412 (1926). But more reluctance
has been shown by the courts to authorize compulsory blood grouping tests in the
absence of statute. See the concurring opinion of Justice Brand in State v. Cram,
176 Ore. 577, 16o P. (2d) 283 at 291 (1945), and cases collected in Note (1946) 163
A. L. R. 939 at 944.
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Fingerprinting requires no extraction of evidence from within the de-
fendant's body, although it is conceivable that a great measure of
"brutality" might be necessary to compel the submission of a recalci-
trant defendant. The use of force might be justified on the ground that
fingerprinting is primarily a method of identification, rather than a
means of obtaining evidence against the accused. Thus, it would seem
that a defendant may be forcibly fingerprinted just as he may be
forced to enter a courtroom to be identified by a witness. 57 There is
greater justification for upholding compulsory fingerprinting than com-
pulsory blood tests as an identifying device. Fingerprints single out
individuals conclusively. No two persons have the same fingerprints.
On the other hand, many people have the same blood type, and blood-
grouping tests merely identify a person as a member of one of a few
groups.
Various tests of intoxication have been employed by law enforce-
ment officials to ferret out the drunken drivers on the highways. The
least technical of these tests is to require the person alleged to be in-
toxicated to perform certain physical acts to demonstrate his sobriety,
such as walking a chalk line, reciting difficult word combinations and
placing his finger to his nose. 58 Samples of blood or urine can be ana-
lyzed to determine the percentage of alcohol present, or the accused may
be required to inflate a balloon to procure a sample of his breath for
analysis in a device called the Harger Drunk-O-Meter. 59
'7Commonwealth v. Di Stasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 N. E. (2d) 189 at 195 (1936);
State v. De Cesare, 68 R. I. 32, 26 A. (2d) 237 (1942); 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.
1940) 374-
For a discussion of the further problem of whether photographs and finger-
prints may be retrieved from police files under certain circumstances, see Note
(1933) 83 A. L. R. 127 at 129.
"In Schmidt v. District Attorney of Monroe County, 255 App. Div. 353, 8 N. Y.
S. (2d) 787 (1938) the evidence was held to have been properly admitted. These
simple tests, when administered by trained police officers or medical examiners, can
be of great value to determine the effect of alcohol on the person allegd to be in-
toxicated, which is a fact as important to ascertain as the quantity of alcohol in
the blood. Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication (1946) 34 Ky. L. J. 25 o . But some
judicial opposition to admitting this evidence has been encountered. In Apodaca v.
State, 14o Tex Crim. 593, 146 S. W. (2d) 381 (1940), noted in (1941) 3 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 122, the Texas court held that the introduction of these tests of intoxica-
tion violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, which is a miscon-
ception of the true limits of the scope of the privilege. However, in Texas, police
officers may testify as to the behavior of the defendant, so long as such conduct was
not induced by the officers. Millican v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. 115, 157 S. W. (2d)
357 (1941). And motion pictures of the defendant's unsolicited behavior is also
admissible. Housewright v. State, 225 S. W. (2d) 417 (Tex. Crim. 1949).
"In addition to the problem of whether an accused may be forced to submit
to these tests, some doubts exist as to the probative value of an analysis of the
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In ruling on the admissibility of these tests for determining intoji:
cation, the courts follow the same pattern as in the cases dealing with
the evidence of blood grouping tests offered to convict a defendant of
crime. No cases have been found dealing with situations where a defen-
dant has been subjected to the intoxication tests by use of physical
force.60 It would seem that such a situation would fall within the rule
of the Rochin case, and the evidence would be inadmissible because ob-
tained by depriving the accused of due process of law. Courts sometimes
require consent to the test to render the results admissible, 61 but in
cases where the defendant was unconscious when the blood or urine
was taken from his body some courts have dispensed with the require-
ment of consent and held the results of the tests admissible.
62
Although the Court in the Rochin case is careful to avoid ex-
pressing an opinion as to the effect of the decision on the use of these
various scientific devices to obtain incriminatory evidence from an
accused, the decision cannot logically apply to stomach pumps without
also applying to some other methods of detection. In theory, obtain-
ing evidence from a man's stomach would seem indistinguishable
from obtaining evidence from his veins, his bladder, or his lungs. Yet
alcohol content of the breath. In People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N. W. (2d)
322 (1949) the court held the results of an analysis made of the defendant's breath
with the Harger Drunk-O-Meter to be unreliable. Evidence obtained by this device
was held admissible in People v. Bobczyk, 99 N. E. (2d) 567 (Ill. App. 1951) and in
McKay v. State, 235 S. W. (ad) 173 (Tex. Grim. 1950). The reliability of blood
and urine tests as evidence of intoxication is now generally conceded. Ladd and
Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests To Determine Intoxication (1943)
29 Va. L. Rev. 749 at 77o; Note (1952) 5 Fla. L. Rev. 5 at 12.
cOBut some courts have allowed police to testify at the trial that a defendant
refused to submit to scientific tests of his body fluids for the purpose of ascertaining
whether he was intoxicated. State v. Benson, 23o Iowa 1168, 300 N. W. 275 (1941);
State v. Gatton, 6o Ohio App. 192, 2o N. E. (2d) 265 (1938). The refusal to submit to a
test is a strong circumstance from which intoxication may be inferred by the jury.
Therefore, when evidence of the defendant's refusal is admitted, the prosecution has
a method of proof almost as persausive as the result of the test itself. This rule
prevents a possible means to escaping the fetters placed on police action by the
Rochin decision; it offers a method of obtaining a conviction, while obviating
the due process objection which might be raised if the officers sought to extract the
defendant's blood over his objection by the use of physical force.
"State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. (2d) 435 (1937). In People v. Corder, 244
Mich. 274, 221 N. W. 3o9 (1928), the result of a physical examination was held
inadmissible in a murder trial where the defendant only consented to the examina-
tion to determine the presence of venereal disease. Cf. State v. Cash, 219 N. C. 818,
15 S. E. (2d) 277 (1941), noted in (1941) 3 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 122 where it was
held that no consent was necessary.
2People v. Tucker, io 5 Cal. App. (2d) 333, 198 P. (2d) 941 (1948); State v.
Ayers, 70 Idaho 18, 211 P. (2d) 14a (1949); Bovey v. State, 197 Misc. 302, 93 N. Y.
S. (2d) 560 (1949); State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, i6o P. (2d) 283 (1945).
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there is no assurance that the Court would adopt this logic in ascer-
taining the scope of the Due Process Clause in these situations; for,
in the words of the Court, "the Constitution is 'intended to preserve
practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories'." 63
RAYMOND W. HAMAN
JAMES H. FLIPPEN, JR.
13Rochin v. California, 72 S. Ct. 205, 210, 96 L. ed. 154, 16o (1952). The Court
cites Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 457, 24 S. Ct. 692, 695, 48 L. ed. 1o67, 1072 (1904).
